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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE B. TAYLOR, et al, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
VIRGINIA CLARE JOHNSON, 




STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff, for herself, and as 
guardian of her minor children, asking damages 
for the death of her· husband, who was killed while 
working on a trailer stopped on the highway. The 
trailer was struck by an automobile driven by the 
defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Jury trial resulted in a verdict of No Cause of 
Action. The trial court denied plaintiff's Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the verdict, or in the 
alternative, for a new trial. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant states "Plaintiff seeks reversal of the 
judg1nent entered, and judgment as to liability in her 
favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial." 
Respondent asks that the Jury Verdict be sustained 
and the trial court affirmed in all particulars. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
References are to the page numbers in the 
Transcript of Proceedings. 
Respondent cannot agree with the statement 
of facts set forth by Appellant. Appellant has re-
cited the facts according to his view of the evidence. 
This court in the case of Ortega vs. Thomas, Su-
preme Court of Utah, Docket No. 9709, Decision 
filed June 28, 1963, not yet reported in Utah or 
Pacific Reports, stated: 
"The rule is so fundamental that the facts 
must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the party who prevailed below, that it is 
an indefensable imposition upon this court 
and opposing counsel not to follow it." 
There is no dispute as to the time and place 
of the accident, June 13, 1961, about 10:30 p.m., on 
Utah Highway U -28, approximately 9.3 miles south 
of Levan. (Tr. 5) It was a dark moonless night. 
The highway was asphalt, 37 feet wide, with a 
broken center line. (T.132) There were painted lines 
on each side of the highway 2 feet, 2 inches from the 
edge of the hard surface. (T. 139) From the center 
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line to the east edge of the hardtop it was 19 feet 
2 inches, and from the center line to the west edge of 
the hardtop was 17 feet 10 inches. (T. 138) 
About 9:30p.m., Don R. Milner, was driving his 
Chevrolet north on Highway U-28, pulling a hoine-
made, 2 wheel, single axle trailer. (T. 9) Milner's 
car struck a deer, damaging the rear right wheel 
housing, and his car stopped on the highway, facing 
north. (T. 9) The right rear wheel left a tire mark 
on the highway, 158 feet 9 inches in length. This 
mark extended south on the highway from directly 
under the right rear wheel (T. 143;32), and was 
8 feet east of the center line. (T. 141) There was 
11 feet 2 inches between the east edge of the asphalt 
road and the right rear wheel of the Milner car. 
(Exhibit P. 13) The investigating police officer, 
Rex Hill, observed the Milner vehicle position on 
the highway and the tire mark leading directly to 
the right rear wheel and under the car. (T. 141) 
Mter hitting the deer, Milner went behind hils 
vehicle, and with a flashlight, flagged down a car 
approaching from the south. (T. 10) The car was 
driven by Everett Kester, accompanied by his wife, 
children and his sister-in-law. (T. 47) !{ester pulled 
ahead of the Milner car, some distance north (T. 10) 
A passing car was flagged and the occupants re-
quested to notify a wrecker. The wrecker was sent 
back to the accident scene. The wrecker operator, 
James Warner Taylor, passed by the accident scene, 
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and drove off the west side of the road where 
there was a clearing. ( T. 11) This clearing, just 
south of the scene, was about 40 feet in width. 
(T. 155) When the wrecker arrived, the trailer 
was unhitched fro1n the Milner automobile and 
moved ·to the East side of the Milner vehicle and 
the wrecker was backed into position directly behind 
the Milner car. (T. 13) Mr. Kester backed his car 
in position in front of the trailer, about a foot 
from the trailer tongue. The trailer hitch was taken 
off of the Milner car to be attached to the Kester 
car. (T. 14) While the trailer hitch was being 
attached to the Kester car, the wrecker operator 
was hooking the Milner car to the \Vrecker, and 
the rear end of Milner car lifted up. (T. 14) 
After Taylor attached the wrecker to the Milner 
car, he went to the area where the trailer was being 
hitched to the Kester automobile, taking some 
wrenches to tighten the bolts. (T. 16) 
As the wrecker was on the roadway it was 
facing south, with headlights on, two flashing am-
ber lights on the fenders, and a rotating blue light 
on top. (T. 17) 
The \vrecker \vas not 1noved after· it was placed 
into position behind the Milner car, and remained 
on the highway facing south with the headlights 
on. (T. 20) . 
There were several fusees, reflectorized stands, 
and pot torches in the wrecker, but none were put 
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out. (T. 156) At no time were any flares or lanterns 
placed on the highway. (T. 28) Fifteen to twenty 
minutes elapsed after the wrecker picked up the 
Milner automobile and the accident happened. (T. 
29) 
As the wrecker was stopped on the highway, 
with the Milner car attached, the wrecker obscured 
the tail lights of the Milner car. (T. 40) The left 
front door of the wrecker was open. (T. 33) There 
was about 3 to 4 feet between the Milner and Kester 
cars. (T. 68) 
Mter Taylor hooked the wrecker onto the 
Milner car, he left the wrecker on the highway, 
and spent several minutes between the trailer and 
the Kester vehicle, working on the trailer hitch. 
(T. 29) 
The trailer had electric lights but they were 
not operative after the trailer was unhitched from 
Milner's car. (T. 30) The wrecker was south of the 
trailer, as the men worked on the trailer hitch. 
The taillights on the Kester vehicle were obscured 
by the trailer. (T. 41) 
With the cars on the highway the scene was 
laid. Miss Johnson, the defendant, had driven from 
Provo to Richfield to visit a friend who had attended 
Brigham Young University with her. She left Rich-
field after dark to return to Provo. (T. 184) 
Just south of the accident scene she was travel-
ling 50 to 60 miles per hour. It was a dark night, 
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with no 1noon or other lights in the area. She came 
around a slight curve, about one-half mile south 
of the accident scene, and observed headlights of 
the wrecker and the blue light on top. (T. 187) She 
saw no flares, or other warning signs and assumed 
the wrecker was moving toward her, and on its 
own side of the road. She looked at her speedometer 
and was travelling 50 miles per hour, and she took 
her foot fron1 the gas pedal. As she neared the 
wrecker, she observed it to be partially in her lane 
of traffic and she had to decide whether to try to 
stop and hit head on, or to try to go to the side of 
the wrecker. ( T. 191) She passed to the east of 
the wrecker and as her lights picked up the objects 
on the highway, after passing the wrecker, she tried 
to apply brakes but struck the rear of the trailer, 
knocking it into Kester car. 
There were several flashlights at the scene be-
fore the accident, and Mrs. Kester had been going 
out south of the wrecker to wave the flashlight 
to warn vehicles fro1n the south. (T.94) Mrs. Kester 
was between the Milner automobile and the Kester 
auto1nobile when she saw the Johnson car approach-
ing, but she did not get out in front of the wrecker 
to warn Miss Johnson. ( T. 7 4) This was the only 
vehicle from the south that had not been signalled 
with a flashlight. (T. 73) 
Officer Rex Hill of the Utah Highway Patrol 
investigated the accident and made measurements. 
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Although the wrecker and 1\'Iilner car were ren1oved 
before he made his measurements, he observed the 
wrecker on the road, facing south in the North-
bound lane of traffic, (T. 123) and observed a long 
tire mark on the highway running underneath the 
right rear wheel of the Milner automobile. This 
mark was 8 feet east of the center line. (T. 141) He 
also observed other physical evidence on the road-
way, gouge marks, skid marks. (T. 135, 137) He 
observed debris on the highway, where the open 
door of the wrecker had been struck, and paint 
knocked off, and he observed the damage to the 
wrecker door. (T. 140) 
Exhibit P -13 received in evidence shows the 
measurements made by the officer, the location of 
the wrecker, Milner automobile, and other physical 
evidence he observed. 
Plaintiff's brief contains a diagram with the 
following explanation: 
"The following diagram, appellants think, 
fairly depicts the respective vehicles on the 
roadway at the time of the collision." 
The diagram is misleading and not in any way in 
accordance with the physical facts found by the in-
vestigating police officers. 
Officer Hill found that the mark left by the 
right rear wheel of· the Milner automobile was 8 
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feet east of the center line of the highway. (T. 141) 
This would leave 11 feet 2 inches of hardtop surface 
of the highway east of the Milner automobile and 
the wrecker, as they were stopped on the highway. 
(T. 164) 
The Milner car and the wrecker occupied 8 
feet of the east side of the highway. There was 4 
feet between the Milner car and the Kester car. 
The Kester car and trailer occupied the remaining 
7 feet 2 inches of the highway. 
In response to a direct question by the plaintiff's 
attorney, as to the probable point of impact, the 
police officer testified that it was indicated by gouge 
marks on the highway, (T. 133, 134) and that the 
Kester car came to rest 76 feet 4 inches north of the 
point of impact. The gouge marks indicated to be the 
probable point of impact, were on the hard surfaced 
portion of the highway, one gouge 6 feet west of 
the east edge of the highway, and the other, 1 foot 
5 inches west of the east edge. (T.139, Exhibit P 13) 
For the use of the court, and to illustrate the 
testimony of the investigating police officer, Appen-
dix 1 is a diagram of the accident scene, showing 
the measurements made by the officer, and the posi-
tion of the vehicles as the scene was set, with the 
wrecker facing south with headlights on, the trailer 
behind the headlights, being attached to the Kester 
vehicle and the east half of the highway blocked. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW AND ANY NEGLIGENCE OF DE-
FENDANT, IF FOUND BY THE JURY, WAS NOT AN 
INDEPENDENT, SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
ACCIDENT. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT WAS NEGLIGENT AND 
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTIONS 
GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
A. Requested Instruction No. 3 of plaintiff 
was Properly Refused by the Court. 
C. Instructions Nos. 30, 33, and 34, as Given 
by the Court were Proper Instructions under 
the Law and Facts of the Case. Plaintiff 
did not Except to Instruction No. 34. 
B. Instructions Nos. 19, 20, 21, and 22 as 
Given by the Court were Proper Instruc-
tions under the Law and Facts of the Case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW AND ANY NEGLIGENCE OF DE-
FENDANT, IF FOUND BY THE JURY, WAS NOT AN 
INDE-PENDENT, SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
ACCIDENT. 
At the time of the accident, the wrecker oper-
ator had completed operations with the wrecker, 
but left it in the middle of the highway, facing 
south with headlights burning, while he went over 
to assist in attaching the trailer to the Kester auto-
mobile, which had been backed into position just 
north of the trailer. 
The only lights facing toward the south were 
those on the wrecker. The Milner car was attached 
to the wrecker, with the rear end hoisted and the 
front toward the ground, facing north. There were 
no taillights on the trailer, and the trailer obscured 
the rear of the Kester vehicle, which was facing 
north. All the vehicles and people were behind the 
wrecker and its headlights. Mr. Kester was holding 
a flashlight to illuminate the area between the trailer 
and ,the Kester vehicle, and Mrs. Kester was between 
the Milner car and the Kester car. No one was.on 
the highway warning oncoming motorists of the 
vehicles stopped on the roadway behind the wrecker 
headlights. The defendant, travelling north, ob-
served headlights facing toward her. She saw a 
revolving blue light and assumed it was a wrecker; 
hovvever, she saw no flares or lights on the highway, 
10 
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and nothing to indicate any trouble and assumed 
that the wrecker was proceeding toward her. She 
did reduce speed by taking her foot off the gas, and 
the last time she looked at her speedometer, it indi-
cated 50 miles per hour. With her foot off the gas 
she continued to approach the wrecker. As she ap-
proached the wrecker, she observed it to be in the 
center of the highway, and kno\ving there was suf-
ficient width to pass to the east, turned right. The 
trap had been laid; the wrecker, with its headlights 
facing south obscuring anything behind it; and the 
trailer and the Kester car blocking the highway 
~ast of the wrecker. Defendant passed the head-
lights, saw something, applied brakes, but was un-
able to stop, and ran into the rear of the trailer. 
The speed of the plaintiff one-half mile back would 
not be a proximate cause of the accident. Mter 
Miss Johnson saw the wrecker apparently approach-
ing, she took her foot of the gas, looked at her 
speedometer, and was then travelling 50 miles an 
hour, which was within the speed limit. 
Appellant, in support of the claim that defend-
ant was negligent, as a matter of law, and her 
negligence was an independent, intervening, sole 
proximate cause of the accident, has failed to sup-
port his contention with any factual situation or any 
case similar in fact or law to the case here involved. 
Appellant cites several Utah cases, but fails to set 
forth the facts of those cases or to point out how 
those cases are applicable. 
11 
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Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 
143, 263 P.2d, 287, was an action for the death of 
a guest passenger in an automobile, that struck a 
truck parked partially on the highway. The question 
in that case was whether the parking of the truck 
on the highway was a concurring proximate cause 
of the accident. That case specifically holds that 
it was a jury question as to whether the negligent 
parking of the truck was a proximate cause of the 
collision, and that the question of proximate cause 
was properly submitted to the jury. As to whether 
or not the driver of the car that collided with the 
truck was negligent, was held to be a jury question. 
The court stated: 
"Ordinarily the question of proximate 
cause is one of fact for the jury, and not one 
of law for the court." 
"Where the actor fails to see the danger 
in time to avoid it, it is held that a jury 
question exists, based on the rational that 
it can be reasonably anticipated that circum-
stances may arise wherein others may not 
observe the dangerous condition until too late 
to avoid it." 
Although the defendant Virginia Johnson saw 
a vehicle approaching on the highway with a revolv-
ing blue light and assumed it to be a wrecker truck, 
there was no fact and no circumstance where she 
could observe, and she had no way of knowing there 
were other vehicles or persons blocking the high-
way. The scene was laid, the truck facing south 
12 
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and it appeared to be approaching toward her and 
on its own side of the road. As she approached she 
reduced speed to within the speed limit. She got 
close to the wrecker and could see it was partially 
on the wrong side of the road. She turned to avoid 
the wrecker, but as she went past her vision 
was obscured and the accident resulted. There 
is no evidence in the record that defendant knew, 
or could have known that there was anyone on the 
highway behind the headlights of the wrecker. She 
did not know the situation existed, and could not 
know that the eleven foot portion of the east half 
of the highwa;y, east of the wrecker, was blocked. 
She avoided the wrecker, although she did strike 
the open door that extended out two feet. She did 
safely pass by that portion of the wrecker that 
was visible. The striking of the door was in no way 
a cause of the accident.. 
In the Hillyard v. Utah By-Products case, this 
court quotes Medvid v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 
19 N.W. 2d 788: 
"If already at that time, by the negligence 
of its driver, the moving vehicle is in such 
a position and under such an impetus that an 
accident cannot be avoided, the negligence 
of the truck driver is as much a proximate 
cause of the accident as is the negligence of 
the driver of the car; the negligence of each 
has contributed to the result." 
The Hillyard case states in recongnizing the proposi-
tion set forth in the Medvid v. Doolittle, supra,: 
13 
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"The doctrine enunciated in the above 
quotations is based upon the proposition that 
one cannot excuse himself from liability aris-
ing from his negligent acts merely because 
the later negligence of another concurs, to 
cause an injury, if the later act was a legally 
foreseeable event. ***" 
That is the question in this case which was submitted 
to the jury. It was a legally forseeable event that a 
car might come from the south on the highway and 
be unaware of the situation that existed; that is, 
that the trailer and the automobiles were blocking 
the east half of the highway; and was the failure to 
place warning flares or signals out, negligence on the 
part of the wrecker opera tor? In this case the ques-
tion was properly submitted to the jury. It is ob-
vious that the people at the scene realized and 
recognized the danger, because the Johnson vehicle 
was the only automobile from the south that had 
not been warned with a flashlight. Certainly the 
other vehicles were able to slow down and avoid a 
collision, because when they approached, a person 
was sent out with a flashlight to warn them. When 
Miss Johnson came there was nothing but a trap 
set on the highway. 
Appellant cites the case of McMurdie v. Un-
derwood, 9 Utah 2nd 400, 246 P.2d 711 Appel-
lant does not set forth what circumstances or 
under what facts, this case is similar in fact to 
14 
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the cited case. Respondent contends this case is not 
in point and is a completely different fact situation. 
That was an appeal to the Supreme Court fro1n a 
jury verdict of no cause of action, and the claim 
of error was to the court's instruction: 
"You are instructed that the driver of 
the pickup truck was negligent as a matter 
of law, and if you find that she observed 
the hazards, if any, of the stopped vehicles 
as she approached on the highway, or in the 
circumstances should have observed said ve-
hicles, but because of her negligence failed 
to do so in time to avoid the accident, then 
you are instructed the negligence on her part 
was a sole proximate cause of the collision, 
and your verdict must be in favor of the de-
fendants against the plaintiff, No Cause of 
Action." 
In the McMurdie vs. Underwood case, the court 
reviewed Hillyard v. Utah By-Products, 1 Utah 2d, 
143, 263 P.2d 287, and states: 
"In applying the test to foreseeability of 
the situations where a negligently created 
pre-existing condition combines with a later 
act of negligence, causing an injury, the 
courts have drawn a clear cut distinction be-
tween the two classes of cases. First situation 
is where one has negligently created a danger-
ous situation such as parking the truck, and 
the later actor observed, or circumstances are 
such that he could not fail to observe, but 
negligently failed to avoid it. The second 
situation involves conduct of a later interven-
ing actor who negligently failed to observe 
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the dangerous condition and too late to avoid 
it. In regard to the first situation, it is held 
as a matter of law that the later intervening 
act does interrupt the natural sequence of 
events and cut off the legal effect of the negli-
gence of the initial actor." 
By the court's own quotation, in order for a 
later intervening act to be an independent interven-
ing sole proxin1ate cause, there must be a dangerous 
condition and a later act observed or circumstances 
are such that he could not fail to observe. We submit 
that in this case there is not one fact or circun1stance 
that shows that defendant observed, or could have 
observed, the situation of cars blocking the highway 
north of the wrecker, with no lights or flares out, 
and no warnings. Defendant had a right to assume, 
and did assume, that the wrecker was approaching 
her on its own side of the road, or that it would 
return to its own side of the road. By the time 
she could tell that it was stopped and was not going 
to move to its own side of the road, she had her 
car under control and passed, to the right of the 
wrecker, but ran into the hidden trailer. There 
is no evidence there was any dangerous situation 
that she could have observed. The McMurdie v. 
Underwood case was submitted to the jury for de-
termination of the various questions and facts in-
volved. 
Appellant did not submit to the court any in-
struction to have the jury determine whether or not 
the circumstances were such that the defendant 
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should have observed, or could not fail to observe 
the dangerous situation. 
Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, 366 P.2d 989, 
Utah 2d 379, is not in point. In that case the facts 
were substantially different. A driver of a bus 
struck a large well-lighted truck parked upon 
the highway when there was at least one and one-
half usable lanes of traffic to the left of the truck. 
The court held that the negligence of the bus driver 
in striking the truck was sole proximate cause of 
the collision. In that case the bus driver saw the 
truck, had all the time necessary to avoid striking 
the truck parked on the highway, but proceeded 
down the highway and hit the truck. The court 
held that the negligence of the bus driver in striking 
the truck when he saw it, and knew it was there, 
and had time to avoid it, was an independent, sole 
intervening act of negligence. That case is in fact 
greatly different from our case. If Miss Johnson 
had struck the wrecker as it was setting on the 
highway, her conduct in striking the wrecker may 
have been an independent intervening act; but she 
saw the wrecker with its headlights facing her, she 
had control of her car, there was a usable part of 
the highway, approximately eleven feet wide to 
her right. She did avoid the wrecker that was 
on the highway and passed around it, except 
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for the striking of the open door, which could not 
be seen behind the headlights. 
None of the cases quoted in the plaintiff's Point 
I are in point ·with the facts and circumstances in this 
case. The trail court submitted to the jury the ques-
tion of the defendant's negligence, and under instruc-
tions and the theories as requested by the plaintiff. 
The evidence is uncontradicted, that as the defendant 
Virginia Johnson drove north, and observed the 
lights of the vehicle coming from the north, she 
assumed that the same was travelling on its own 
side of the highway. This assumption is well found-
ed and supported by case law. 
In Barnes v. Ashworth, Va., 153 S.E. 2d 711, 
a motorist stopped his car on the wrong side of the 
highway on a rainy night, with lights on, and left 
it in this position, it was held to be negligence as 
a matter of law, and would preclude recovery by 
the driver. The case held the person approaching 
did not realize the car was parked on the wrong 
side of the road, until nearly upon it, and 
then swung to the right and collided with a car 
stopped on the right side, which was without lights 
and which the driver did not see. This case is similar 
to our case. The court held the one stopping on the 
wrong side of the highway, was negligent as a 
matter of law, and his negligence was a proximate 
cause of his injury and death. 
At 70 A.L.R. 1021 is an annotation holding: 
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"The driver of an automobile on a pu'Qlic 
highway at night who sees in front of him 
the headlights of another car facing him has 
the right to assume that such car is in motion 
and will be operating and conform with the 
law of the road, and the driver approaching 
cannot be charged with contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law in failing to stop or 
discover that the other car is stopped or dis-
covered that the other car is stalled on its 
left of the center of the highway in such a 
position that there was no approaching room 
for the car to pass on the proper side, until 
it was too late to avoid the collision." 
Hatch v. Daniels, Vermont, 117 A. 105, held: 
"One driving an automobile on a public 
road who sees a car approaching on the high-
way has the right at the outset to assume it 
will observe the law of the road and will move 
to its right, and the driver may proceed on 
this assumption, and it is a jury question as to 
under what circumstances the approaching 
driver should realize the other car is or will 
remain on the wrong side of the highway." 
Padgett v. Brangan, Kentucky, 15 S.W. Sec. 
277, held: 
"A party has a right to assume when 
approaching in the nighttime, a car parked 
on the wrong side of the road with its head-
lights on facing him that the car is on its own 
side of the road." 
Bradley v. Clarke, Kentucky, 293 S. W. 2d 1082, 
held a plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law, when he approached a stopped 
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truck with its lights on, and drove to the right of 
the truck, thinking that the truck was moving, and 
then discovered the situation that there was a park-
ed car behind the truck lights, swung around to the 
wrong side and struck a wrecked car, which he 
could not see until too late to avoid it. 
The case of Doane v. Smith, Calif., 147 P.2d 
650 held: 
"It cannot be said as a matter of law at 
what definite distance from parked vehicles 
at which an approaching driver must realize 
the vehicle is standing still, in order to be 
free of negligence, and it cannot be said that 
a plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law 
in failing to realize the truck was standing 
still until he was within 100 feet of it. It must 
be remembered that automobile drivers have 
the right to anticipate the standing vehicles 
ahead of them will be parked off the highway 
if it is practical to park there, and has the 
right to act upon that assumption until there 
is some reasonable grounds for believing there 
is some vehicle ahead that is not so parked." 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT WAS NEGLIGENT AND 
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
At the time this accident occured,- Mr. Taylor 
had hooked onto the Milner automobile, was in a 
position to move off the highway, but went to where 
the trailer was being attached to the Kester car, 
and was assisting Kester and Milner in attaching 
the trailer to the car. There was no rescue operation 
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or any em-ergency that required the wrecker oper-
ator to assist Mr. Kester and Mr. Milner. 
Although the defendant admitted she saw the 
wrecker when she was approximately a half mile 
away, and saw a revolving blue light, no warning 
devices, flares, fusees, pot lights were out on the 
highway. Counsel for appellant states that it seems 
unlikely that the failure to place flares would be 
of any consequence. Defendant testified that she 
looked for flares or warnings and saw none. All 
she saw were headlights approaching, with a re-
volving blue light which she assumed to be a wrecker 
moving on its own side of the road. There was 
no indication or warning of any trouble ahead on 
the roadway. 
The appellant contends this case is similar to 
the Velasquez vs. Greyhound case, supra but the 
facts are much different. In that case, the driver 
of the bus did see the truck parked on the 
half of the highway to pass and intended to turn 
out, but claimed a blackout for some reason or 
another, and ran into the plainly visible bus. In this 
case, Miss Johnson did not run in to the wrecker. The 
collision was with the trailer, hidden behind the 
headlights of the wrecker. 
Appellant calls attention to the fact that all the 
other drivers coming from the south were able to 
bring their cars under control, and passed around 
the blockade. The evidence was that every car that 
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approached from the south, prior to the time Miss 
Johnson approached, had been warned with a signal 
by flashlight. The Johnson car was the only 
one not warned. Appellant states that defendant 
argues that Taylor, after attaching the auto to 
the wrecker, had time to remove the vehicles off 
the highway. Defendant contended that after the 
Milner car was attached to the wrecker, the wrecker 
could have moved off the highway in such a position 
that Mr. Taylor would have been in no danger and 
the wrecker out of the way so that its headlights 
were not blinding oncoming traffic, and the head-
lights of the Johnson car could have, and would 
have picked up the objects on the highway in front 
of her, and the accident could have been avoided. 
Mr. Taylor had flares, fusees and reflectorized 
stands, and none of these were put out on the 
highway. The trap was laid when he left the truck 
facing south and no warning signals out and Taylor 
was behind the headlights where northbound drivers 
couldn't see. The headlights of the wrecker did not 
constitute warning lights. The record fails to show, 
and appellant does not quote any law or case to 
indicate that a blue light on the top of the vehicle 
is any type of a warning light. 
Appellant contends plaintiff's decedent was not 
guilty of any contributory negligence. Instruction 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
No. 18 given by the court, is a requested instruction 
of the plaintiff, and covers contributory negligence. 
The issue of contributory negligence was submitted 
to the jury pursuant to a requested instruction by 
the defendant, and pursuant to a requested instruc-
tion on contributory negligence by the plaintiff. As 
this court said in the case of Mann vs. Fairbourn, 
12, Utah 2nd. 342, 366 P.2d 603: 
"If the instruction and theory of law 
were improper, it would come within the rule 
of invited error." 
In that case, the plaintiff had asked for instruction 
on contributory negligence of a child, and then later 
complained to the court in submitting the matter of 
contributory negligence to the jury, this court said: 
"The plaintiff did not request an instruc-
tion to the effect that a child under six years 
of age could not be guilty of contributory 
negligence, and instruction No.6 of which he 
now complains is substance the same as his 
requested instruction No. 3. Under such cir-
cumstances, the instruction, if erroneous, 
would come within the rule of invited error, 
of which the plaintiff cannot here avail him-
self." 
The court in making this state1nent cites Alvarez 
vs. Paulus,-8 Utah 2d 283,333 P.2d 633, and Pettingill 
vs. Perkins, 2 U tab 2nd. 66, 272 P .2d 185. 
The plaintiff asked the court specifically to 
instruct the jury on contributory negligence, and 
plaintiff cannot now complain. 
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Appellant has failed to cite any case or law in 
support of the contention that the plaintiff's deced-
ent was not guilty of contributory negligence. 
Appellant claims that if the plaintiff was negli-
gent, such negligence was not a proximate cause of 
the accident. Appellant cites the Velasquez vs. Grey-
hound Lines case, Supra, in the support of the claim. 
In the previous point we have discussed the case of 
Velasquez vs. Greyhound Bus Lines as not in point, 
not similar in fact, in law, of the point herein in-
volved. 
The negligence on the part of the plaintiff was 
his failure to place flares or other warning devices 
on the highway, his failure to move the wrecker off 
of the highway when he had sufficient time to do 
so, from five to twenty minutes; and his failure to 
keep a lookout for his own safety. 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, and when 
plaintiff's counsel took exception to the court's in-
struction, appellants counsel candidly stated: 
"That the only question with respect to 
negligence which should have been submitted 
to the jury was whether or not the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence and 
which said contributory negligence, if any, 
was a proximate cause of the injuries claimed. 
This, of course, does not intend to exclude 
the submission to the jury the damages ques-
tioned."(?:- 2 ")_ ~) 
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No exception was taken by plaintiff to instruc-
tion No. 18 given by the court, which submitted the 
issue of contributory negligence to the jury. The 
plaintiff could not except to this instruction as he 
made the request for the instruction and never with-
drew the same. Instruction No. 17 given by the 
court was an instruction concerning contributory 
negligence and its effect, defeating the claim of the 
plaintiff. There was no exception taken to this 
instruction and no objection to the jury being in-
structed upon that theory of the case. Appellant's 
counsel, now before the court, claims that it was 
error to submit the matter of contributory negli-
gence to the jury. At the time of the trial he did 
not object to that matter going to the jury, and in 
effect stated that it was appropriate for the jury, 
and requested an instruction on that defense. 
Appellant contends it ·would not be negligence 
on the part of Taylor, to stop on the traveled 
portion of the highway longer than a reasonable 
length of time or to occupy more of the highway than 
was reasonably necessary or fail to warn approach-
ing traffic by lights designated by the Utah Road 
Commission, or by other lights, flares, or practical 
means, if his vehicle was not equipped with lights 
designated by the Utah Road Commission. Instruc-
tion No. 26 was a requested instruction by the plain-
tiff, and there was no exception taken by plaintiff. 
The plaintiff had the jury instructed that it was the 
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duty of the defendant not to stop on the traveled 
portion of the highway longer than a reasonable 
length of time, and not to occupy more of the high-
way than was reasonably necessary, and to reason-
ably warn approaching traffic of the obstruction on 
the roadway by lights designated by the Utah State 
Road Commission or by other lights, flares or prac-
tical means, if his vehicle was not equipped with 
lights designated by the Utah Highway Commission. 
The record is void of evidence that the Utah 
State Highway Commission at any time designated 
any lights for wreckers. Admittedly, the statute 
allows the U tab State Road Commission to des-
ignate, but there is no evidence in the record as to 
what, if any lights have ever been designated for 
wreckers, by the Utah State Road Commission. 
Evidence in the case was sufficient to have a 
jury find that Taylor failed to keep a proper lookout 
for his own safety, failed to place out any warning 
lights and signals, and obstructed the highway and 
left his vehicle facing south with its lights obscuring 
what was behind and interfering with oncoming 
traffic. 
Cases are many holding that it is negligence for 
a person to stop a vehicle on the highway, with 
lights facing oncoming traffic, and failing to place 
out warning signs. Gutierrez, et al vs. Koury, 57 
N.M. 741 263, P.2d 557, held that even though the 
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driver of a truck did not have a statutory duty to 
put flares or other lights on the highway to warn 
motorists when he, because of ignition trouble, stop-
ped his truck on the highway at night, the truck 
driver owed the duty to motorists to exercise reason-
able care to warn him of their peril and his failure 
to do so would constitute negligence which was 
the proximate cause of injury sustained by motorists 
when an auto ran into the rear of the stopped truck. 
The case held, in the absence of notice to the con-
trary, a motorist has the right to assume that the lane 
of traffic in which he is travelling is free from 
obstruction, and if not, that one responsible for its 
blockade would give adequate and proper warning 
thereof, and he is not bound to anticipate that 
a truck driver would leave the truck standing in 
the middle of the paved portion of the highway 
unattended, without lights. 
Frame vs. Arrow Towing Service, 64 P.2d 1312, 
Ore., held that there was common law duty of the 
operator of a tow car working on the scene of a 
wrecked automobile to place a sign on the roadway 
warning oncoming traffic of obstruction of the high-
way, and the failure to put out signals would estab .. 
lish a prima facie case of negligence against such 
operator. Callison vs. Dondero, 124 P.2d 852, held 
that where a defendant's vehicle was equipped with 
flame pots and the defendant failed to use the flame 
pots or otherwise warn drivers of the plaintiff's 
truck, might be properly considered in determining 
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whether the defendant was guilty of a failure to 
exercise ordinary care, although the defendant may 
not have violated a statute by failing to place the 
flame pots or other warning signals on the highway 
after he parked his truck on the highway. 
In Early vs. Jackson, 243 P.2d 444, 120 Utah 
464, the defendant had parked his car on the 
highway, at nighttime partially off the road and 
no flares were placed to warn oncoming traffic 
of the obstruction. The headlights were left burn-
ing facing slightly to the northwest, so that a driver 
was not able to determine until he was within 250 to 
300 feet of the parked truck, that it was obstructing 
one en tire lane of traffic. The Utah Supreme Court 
held, as a matter of law, that the one who parked 
the truck was negligent and stated: 
"The driver of appellant's car was con-
fronted with an emergency of respondent's 
making and was in a worse position than 
respondent, who knew of the danger at all 
times, to avoid the accident." 
The Supreme Court held the lower Court erred in 
failing to grant appellant's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. In this case, the Su-
preme Court recognized that it would be negligence 
to stop a car on the highway at night, without flares 
or lights to warn of blocking the lane of traffic. 
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See also Fortman v. McBride, Iowa, 263 N.W. 
345, which held that a decedent was contributorily 
negligent as a rna tter of law in trying to push his 
car while it was blocking one side of the roadway 
and while his back was to oncoming traffic, was 
devoting his entire attention to attempting to move 
his car, when he must have known from the head-
lights of the defendant's automobile that a car was, 
approaching and he could have seen it and failed to 
watch and move. 
The case of Ashe vs. Hughes, Mississippi, 69 So. 
2d 210, where a wrecker parked on the highway, 
while assisting a disabled vehicle, was held not sub-
ject to the statute requiring flares to be put out 
because the wrecker was not disabled, but the plain-
tiff in the action, who was suing the wrecker, because 
of colliding with the same, had the right to have 
submitted to the jury, under the proper instruction, 
the question of whether the failure to use flares 
was common law negligence. Gonyo vs. Hewson, 
162 N.Y. Supp. 2d 304, held even though there was 
no statutory duty to place flares in the daytime, 
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there was a common law duty for a truck operator 
to put flares which were available in his truck while 
it was stopped on the highway during a snowstorm. 
Gaber vs. Weinberg, Pa., 188 A. 187, held that it was 
a jury question and might be a common law duty 
in the exercise of reasonable care, for the operator 
of a truck to warn approaching motorists by the use 
of flares or other signals when stopped on the high-
way. Vandenack vs. Crosby, Wisconsin, 82 N.W. 2d 
307, held that a wrecker truck was engaged in an 
emergency rescue operation, did not excuse the 
driver's failure to place flares on the highway. 
The court held the operators of such trucks must 
exercise ordinary care to warn other traffic of the 
obstruction of the highway, and particularly where 
the truck had been stopped for some period of time. 
An Idaho case, Baldwin vs. Mittry, 102 P.2d 
643, held that although a statute did not make 
it obligatory for a wrecker operator to use flares 
on the highway, that the failure of ,a wrecker 
operator to put flares on the highway raised a jury 
question as to whether or not the operator of the 
wrecker had exercised ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances. Whitworth v. Riley, Okla. 269 P. 350 held 
that a person who drives his automobile to the left 
of the center of the public highway in the nighttime, 
and becomes stalled in a position that would not 
permit passage of an automobile travelling in the 
opposite direction to the right, and so stands 
with the headlights on to indicate a moving car, 
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constitutes prima facie evidence of the negligence 
of the driver thereof, in event of collision by another 
automobile who by virtue of the rules of the road 
had the right to assume from the facts the headlights 
were on, that the stalled car was in motion and was 
being operated in conformity with the law. In Ed-
blad vs. Brewer, Minnesota, 227 N.W. 493 a driver 
who had stopped late at night, on his right side of 
the highway to change a tire and defendant, passing 
in the opposite direction stopped to offer assistance 
and backed his car behind the stopped car so that 
the headlights on the defendant's car were facing 
forward on the wrong side of the road and an ap-
proaching car driver deceived and collided with 
the front of the car of the defendant, resulting in 
plaintiff's injuries. The court said in affirming the 
judgment for the plaintiff who had struck the car 
that was stopped: 
"We think it is so clear the law of the 
road forbids stopping as where the appellant 
did that we shall not discuss the assignment 
of error on the part of the charge to advise 
the jury that it was negligent to do so, and 
that such negligence was a :_eroximate cause 
of the collision that was liability, unless con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff was 
involved." 
Padgett vs. Brangan, Kentucky, 15 S.W. 2d, 277, 
held a defendant negligent as a matter of law 
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. in parking his truck on the left side of the road 
with the lights on at night. Barnes vs. Ashworth, 
Va., 153 S.E. 2nd 711, held that one stopping his car 
on the wrong side of the road on a rainy night, with 
the lights on is negligent as a matter of law. 
Cooper vs. Teter, 15 S.E. 2d 152 West V a., held 
that a wrecker truck being used to restore a wrecked 
automobile to the highway may stand on the travel-
ed portion of the highway for a reasonable length 
of time but must not occupy more highway than 
is reasonably necessary, and approaching traffic 
must be fully warned to the obstruction by lights, 
flags, guards or all other practical means. 
Blashfield Encyclopedia Automobile Law, Vol. 
2A, Sec. 1202, page 50, states: 
"Irrespective for the reason for stopping 
the vehicle on the highway the driver is under 
a reasonable care to give proper and adequate 
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Rasing vs. H eazler, Kan., 142 P.2d 832, held 
that a defendant, stopped on the highway supplied 
with flame pots or flares, his failure to use then1 
might be considered negligence, although his failure 
was not a violation of the statutes for the reason 
that the truck was not disabled. 
Respondent respectfully contends that there 
was clear evidence of the negligence of the plaintiff's 
decedent in failing to put out any warning lights, 
when he had them, and in working between the 
trailer and the car under the situation set up 
when the trailer and the Kester car were behind 
the lights, and leaving his wrecker on the highway 
facing the wrong way to mislead the oncoming 
drivers, who had a right to assume that it was 
moving and on its own side of the highway. By the 
time the oncoming driver could determine that the 
vehicle was not moving or was not on its own side 
of the highway an emergency situation had arisen, 
and defendant, with the car under control, drove to 
her right and passed to the side where there was 
sufficient width of the highway, and came into the 
situation that had been set up and, which had been 
obscurred from her vision, because the headlights 
of the wrecker faced directly down the road. There 
was sufficient facts for the jury to determine that 
the plaintiff's decedent was negligent. The case was 
properly submitted to the jury upon the theory of 
negligence, and contributory negligence. There was 
never any objection fro1n the attorney for the ap-
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pellant, to the submission of the case to the jury on 
the matter of contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff's decedent. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTI0'N"S 
GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
A. Requested Instruction No. 3 of plaintiff 
was Properly Refused by the Court. 
B. Instructions Nos. 19, 20, 21, and 22 as 
Given by the Court were Proper Instruc-
tions under the Law and Facts of the Case. 
Plaintiff Failed to Except to Instruction 
No. 22. 
C. Instructions Nos. 30, 33, and 34, as Given 
by the Court were Proper Instructions under 
the Law and Facts of the Case. Plaintiff 
did not Except to Instruction No. 34. 
Appellant's counsel makes a blanket complaint 
to the court's instructions as a whole and states 
they are contradictory; serve to over emphasize 
particular aspects of the case; permit the jury to 
speculate; are indefinite; and prejudicial to the 
plaintiff. Appellant fails to advise in what particu-
lars the instructions were contradictory; how they 
over emphasized particular aspects of the case; how 
they permitted the jury to speculate; how they were 
indefinite; and how they were prejudicial to plain-
tiff. The all inclusive complaint about the instruc-
tions, without specifying the particulars of the al-
leged error and with no law to support the bald 
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claims of error, makes it difficult to know of what 
plaintiff complains. With no specification as to the 
contradiction; over emphasis; speculation; indef-
initeness; and prejudice, the claim of error in appel-
lant's point three opening paragraph lacks merit. 
It should not be incumbent upon respondent to 
answer bald claims of error made without specifica-
tion or particular. 
Appellant complains of the failure of the court 
to grant a directed verdict for the plaintiff, on the 
issue of liability. There was no exception to the 
court's refusal to instruct the jury to return a ver-
cict in favor of the plaintiff. The motion by plain-
tiff or a directed verdict was made with no reason 
or basis specified. The court refused to so instruct 
the jury, plaintiff failed to except to the failure to 
instruct the jury in accordance with the request to 
return a verdict of liability for plaintiff, and plain-
tiff has wavied any objection to the failure of the 
court to so instruct the jury on the liability issue. 
Appellant takes the position that the only ques-
tion which should have been submitted to the jury, 
was the question of damages, and the court should 
have directed a verdict for plaintiff At the time of 
taking of exceptions to the jury, counsel for plain-
tiff stated into the record: 
"That the only question with respect to 
negligence which should have been submitted 
to the jury was whether or not the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence and 
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which contributory negligence, if any, was a 
proximate cause of the injuries claimed." 
(T. 226). 
Counsel cannot now logically contend that the 
court should have directed a verdict for plaintiff, 
when for the record, he stated that the issue of neg-
ligence of the plaintiff's decedent, and proximate 
cause, were questions for the jury. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO.3 WAS PROPERLY REFUS-
ED BY THE COURT. 
Plaintiffs requested Instruction No. 3 was a 
request that the court instruct the jury, as a matter 
of law, that defendant had the last clear chance to 
avoid the accident. The instruction requested was: 
"The defendant has admitted that she 
saw the lights of the wrecker at a time when 
she was a approximately one-half mile away 
and that she recognized that it was a wrecker 
at that time. She also has admitted that she 
continued toward the wrecker without mater-
ially slowing her car by application of brakes 
until she was within feet of the car. 
She has also admitted that she could not see 
ahead of the lights that were on the wrecker 
and that it was her intention to go around 
that vehicle although she could not see ahead. 
She therefore had the last clear chance to 
avoid the accident. In these circumstances 
any act of negligence on the part of the plain-
tiffs' decedent, that is on the part of Mr. 
James Warner Taylor, would not bar recovery 
by the plaintiffs." 
Under the facts of the case, the theory of last 
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clear chance was not applicable. In any event, the 
requested instruction fails to embody the proper 
elements of the theory of last clear chance, and is 
erroneous in that it requests the court to hold as a 
matter of law, that the defendant had the last clear 
chance to avoid the accident. Appellant relies upon 
the case of Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah 2nd 174, 350 P.2d 
154, as authority that his requested Instruction No. 
3 should have been given. The Fox v. Taylor case 
is directly contrary to the appellant's position that 
the case should have been submitted to the jury 
upon the theory of last clear chance. As stated by 
the court in Fox v. Taylor: 
"The cases where that doctrine is applic-
able fall into two distinct categories. The 
first we here consider, relates to situations 
where both the defendant and the plaintiff 
are guilty of continuing negligence, and 
where the plaintiff could, by exercising due 
care, avoid the peril at any time up to the 
moment of injury. In such case, the injury 
is the result of the concurring negligence .of 
both the plaintiff and the defendant. Under 
those facts the defendant can be held respons-
ible only if he actually knows of the plain tiff's 
situation of peril in time to have the last 
clear chance to avoid the harm, and fails to 
do so. 
"The plaintiff insists, however, that the 
doctrine of last clear chance is applicable and 
the defendant should be held liable even if he 
did not see her, because in the exercise of due 
care he should have observed and avoided 
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striking her. This contention involves consid-
eration of the other facet of the doctrine of 
last clear chance. Where the defendant does 
not actually know of the plaintiff's situation 
of peril, the doctrine can only be properly 
applied where the plaintiff has gotten into a 
position of inextricable peril. An illustration 
of this is where a person has caught his foot 
in a railroad switch, or is in some other sim-
ilar predicament, so that he is thereafter un-
able to avert the injury. In such a situation, 
the plaintiff's negligence has come to rest." 
The requested instruction by plain tiff does not 
enco1npass the legal principles necessary to properly 
instruct a jury on the theory of last clear chance, 
and as such principles are set forth in the cas·e of 
Fox v. Taylor, supra, and the Utah cases cited 
therein. 
The defendant Virginia Johnson did not know 
of the Mr. Taylor's situation, and therefore the situ-
ation did not con1e under the first category of last 
clear chance as set forth by the Utah Court in Fox 
v. Taylor, supra. 
There is no claim or evidence in the record, 
that the James Warner Taylor was in an extricable 
peril situation. The oncoming vehicle was visible for 
one-half mile, from the south. Taylor was working 
between the trailer and Kester automobile with Mr. 
Milner and Mr. Kester. (T. 24-25) There were no 
flares, signs or warnings out. (T. 28) A look to the 
south would have indicated a vehicle approaching 
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and allowed him to move off the road. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Taylor was 
in a position of inextricable peril and allow the doc-
trine of last clear chance to be applied under the 
second category set forth in Fox v. Taylor, Supra. 
Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that would 
support a last clear chance instruction to be submit-
ted to the jury in this case. 
B. INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 19, 20, 21, and 22 
WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO 
THE JURY. 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedures pro-
vides: 
"Instructions to Jury: Objections. No 
party may assign as error the giving or fail-
ure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto. In objecting to the giving of an in--
struction, a party must state distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the grounds 
for his objection." 
There was no exception by plaintiff to Instruc-
tion No. 22. 
Plaintiff complains of Instruction No. 19. The 
instruction was: 
"Everyone who has driven an automobile 
in the nighttime and every observant person 
who has ridde in an automobile in the night-
time and has met an oncoming automobile 
with burning lights, knows that the lights 
obscure objects behind it for a distance before 
the auotmobile is reached until a time after its 
lights are passed." 
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This instruction was proper. The wrecker oper-
ator left his vehicle in the center of the road, facing 
south, with headlights on. The fact that it was 
moving or stopped would not change the fact that 
headlights would obscure objects behind the head-
lights. This instruction was specifically approved 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the cases of Fretz v. 
Anderson, 5 Utah 2nd 290, 300 P.2d 642, and Feder-
ated Milk Producers Association, etc. v. Statewide 
Plumbing and Heating Company, 11 Utah 2nd 295, 
358 p .2d 348. 
Instruction No. 20 given by the court was: 
"A driver of a motor vehicle is not expect-
ed to he capable of acting instantaneously 
upon seeing danger, as the law takes notice 
of the fact that it takes a certain time for the 
driver's eyes, mind and muscular system to 
act, and for the brakes of the car to be applied 
thereafter. This period of time is known as 
reaction time. While it is generally recognized 
that the average time of the normal person 
to react at first recognizing and realizing 
danger in the daytime and under ordinary 
conditions is approximately % of a second, 
you are entitled to consider the fact that such 
time may vary somewhat with the particular 
individual and with all the attendant circum-
stances and conditions at the time and place 
of the accident." 
It was a proper instruction and applicable to 
the general facts and situation in the case. It is 
not prejudicial to the plaintiff and is the reiteration 
of a well-established fact of which the court may 
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take judicial knowledge. Howa1·d v. Ringsby Truck 
Lines, 2 Utah 2nd 65, 269 P .2d 295. 
Instruction No. 21 was: 
"You are hereby instructed that the law 
did not require the said Virginia Claire John-
son to anticipate or guard against anything 
which could not reasonably be expected and 
did not require her to regulate her conduct 
with reference to any conduct on the part of 
James W. Taylor, not reasonably to be expect-
ed, nor did the law require Virginia Clair 
Johnson to be extraordinarily alert or to fore-
see all that can be seen by looking backward 
after the accident happened. In other words, 
the said Virginia Johnson was not under a 
duty to foresee all that she might at this time 
be able to see or appreciate by lookino back 
at the accident; nor was she required to use 
extraordinary caution for the avoidance of 
an accident that she could not have expected 
under the circumstances. 
"In this connection, you are further in-
structed that if the said Virginia Johnson 
could not, in the exercise of ordinary care, 
under the circumstance avoided a collision, 
then plaintiffs cannot recover and if you so 
find, your verdict should be in favor of de-
fendant and against the plaintiffs." 
This is a correct statement of the "hindsight 
rule" and was not prejudicial to the plaintiff. 
This instruction is in substance from the Utah 
Supreme Court decision of Olsen v. W arwood, 123 
Utah 111, 255 P.2d 725. 
Instruction No. 22 was: 
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"If you find that the defendant was a 
person who, without negligence on her part, 
is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with 
peril, arisig from either the actual presence, 
or the appearance, of imminent danger to 
herself or to others, then she is not expected, 
nor required, to use the same judgment and 
prudence that is required of her, in the exer-
cise of ordinary care, in calmer and more 
deliberate moments. Her duty is to exercise 
only the care that ordinarliy prudent persons 
would exercise in the same situation. If at the 
moment she does what appears to her to be 
the best thing to do, and if her choice and 
manner of action are the same as might have 
been followed by an ordinarily prudent person 
under the same conditions, she does all the 
law requires of her, although, in the light of 
after-events, it should appear that a different 
court would have been better and safer." 
This is the emergency doctrine set forth by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Howard vs. Ringsby Truck 
Lines, 2 Utah 2d 65, 269 P .2d 295. 
This is a correct statement of the doctrine as 
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. The instruc-
tion does not tell the jury that an emergency exist'3d, 
but -left it for the jury to determine from the facts, 
and the instruction was proper and correctly sub-
mitted to the jury. 
The appellant has submitted no law to support 
the claim that the giving of lnstruciton Nos. 19, 20, 
21 and 22 was erroneous, as to any, or all of said 
instructions. We assume that appellant, not sup-
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porting his claim of error with any law, could find 
none to support his contentions that said instruc-
tions were erroneous. / 
C. INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 30, 3'3, and 34 AS 
GIVEN BY THE COURT WERE PRO-
PER INSTRUCTIONS UNDER THE LAW 
AND FACTS OF THE CASE. PLAINTIFF 
DID NOT EXCEPT TO INSTRUCTION 
34. 
Plaintiff contends that Instruction Nos. 30, 33 
and 34 given by the court were erroneous. A blanket 
charge of error is made to these instructions. No 
exception to instruction No. 34 appears in the record. 
In argument that Instruction Nos. 30, 33 and 
34 w·ere erroneous and prejudicial, appellant states 
no law to aid the court or respondent in determining 
in what particulars said instructions are claimed to 
be erroneous and prejudicial. 
Instruction No. 30 stated: 
"One who places himself in a dangerous 
position has the duty to use his faculties for 
hearing and seeing to avoid being struck by 
vehicles upon the highway. If you find from 
a preponderance of the evidence that James 
W. Taylor was working in a dangerous posi-
tion between the Milner trailer and the Kes-
ter automobile and further find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that James W. 
Taylor did not use reasonable care to watch 
for the approach of vehicles on the highway, 
and there were no flares or other warning 
signals placed on the highway to warn motor-
ists approaching from the south, then you 
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may find James W. Taylor was negligent, and 
plaintiffs cannot recover if such lack of 
reasonable care was a proximate cause of the 
collision." 
This instruction is a correct statement of the 
law, as to one who is in a dangerous situation being 
required to use his faculties to avoid injury. Taylor 
was working between an automobile and a trailer, 
on the main traveled highway. His wrecker was 
facing south, with the headlights obscuring the high-
way behind the wrecker. It is undisputed that there 
were no flares or signals on the highway. The 
wrecker operator on the scene for one-half hour or 
1nore, and his wrecker equipped with flares, fuses, 
and reflectorized stands, failed to use these warning 
devices to protect himself and others on the high-
way. The defendant did not strike the wrecker on 
the highway, but defendant passed to the side of 
it, with sufficient room on the east side for passage, 
but the east portion of the highway, behind the head-
lights, was blocked. 
Instruction No. 33 was a correct statement of 
the law for the jury under the facts of this case. 
The instruction is proper and supported by the evi-
dence and law. This instruction was as follows: 
"Although the driver of a wrecker may be 
excused for stopping on the highway while 
actively engaged in removing wrecked or dis-
abled vehicles, the wrecker operator must use 
reasonable care and diligence in moving his 
wrecker from the highway if he has sufficent 
44 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
opportunity to do so. You are instructed that 
a wrecker truck being used to pick up or 
restore a damaged vehicle on the highway 
may stand on the traveled portion of the 
highway only for the reasonable length of 
tim·e necessary to do the work, but must not 
occupy more of the highway than is reason-
ably necessary and approaching traffic must 
be fully warned of the obstruction by the use 
of lights, flags, guards or any other practical 
means. Remaining on the traveled portion of· 
the highway for a period of time longer than 
reasonably necessary to remove a wrecked or 
damaged vehicle may constitute negligence 
and the failure to warn approaching traffic of 
the obstruction by lights, flags, guards or any 
other practical means may also constitute neg-
ligence on the part of the wrecker operator." 
Plaintiff complains that this instruction does 
not take into consideration proximate cause. The 
instruction only went to the duty of the wrecker 
operator remaining on the highway and as to the 
use of flares or signals when he remained on the 
highway. The matter of whether or not such neg-
ligence, if any the jury found, was a proxhnate 
cause of the accident, was covered in other instruc-
tions of the court, particularly Instruction Nos. 17 
and 18. Proximate cause is properly covered in those 
instructions and it is not necessary that the instruc-
tion as to negligence contains the element of proxi-
mate cause. Instruction No. 33 does not tell the jury 
that if they find the wrecker driver negligent, then 
plaintiff could not recover. The instruction covers 
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negligent conduct, and not conclusions or effect of 
negligence on the part of the wrecker operator. 
Instruction No. 23 was as follows: 
"The operator of a vehicle stopped on the 
highway at night time owes a duty to oncom-
ing motorists to exercise reasonable care to 
warn them of the peril and the obstruction 
of the highway. If you find from a preponder 
ance of the evidence that James W. Taylor 
did not use ordinary care and diligence to 
warn oncoming motorists of the obstruction 
on the east half of the highway where the 
collision occurred, and if you further find 
that such negligence was a proximate cause 
of the collision, then you may find James W. 
Taylor was negligent and you may return a 
verdict for the defendant and against the 
plaintiffs, no cause of action." 
This instruction with all the instructions is a 
correct instruction on defendant's theory that James 
W. Taylor failed to exercise reasonable care to warn 
oncoming motorists of the obstruction on the high-
way, and that such failure, if found to be a proxi-
mate cause of the accident, would bar plaintiff's re-
covery. 
Instructions 30, 33 and 34 are separate instruc-
tions, and different defenses and theories of the 
defendant's case. Instruction No. 33 covers the situ-
ation of the wrecker operator being in a dangerous 
situation on the highway, with no flares or signals 
to warn oncoming motorists, and covers his duty to 
use his faculties for hearing and seeing to avoid 
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being struck by automobiles approaching. 
Instruction No. 33 covers the situation of the 
driver removing his wrecker from the highway 
after his work is completed, and if leaving it on the 
highway, of the exercise of ordinary care in using 
flares or lights, flags or other warning devices. 
Instruction No. 34 is a general instruction of 
the duty to exercise reasonable care, and proximate 
cause. 
Plaintiff complains that Instruction No. 25 is 
in conflict with Instruction Nos. 30 and 33. Instruc-
tion No. 25, requested by plaintiff, is not in conflict, 
as the evidence in the case clearly indicates that at 
the time of the accident, the wrecker was not being 
used to remove a stalled vehicle from the highway. 
The wrecker operator had completed his work of 
attaching the Milner car to the wrecker and then, 
rather than moving off the highway, he went over 
to work on the trailer hitch. At the time of the 
accident, the wrecker was parked on the highway 
and was not being used to remove a stalled vehicle 
from the highway. 
Cases are many that it is negligence for a per-
son to work on the highway at night without placing 
flares or warning devices to warn oncoming motor-
ists, and that one working on a highway at night 
must keep a lookout for oncoming vehicles. 
Callison v. Dondero, California 124 P.2d 852, 
held that a defendant truck driver who stopped his 
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truck on the paved portion of the highway, and the 
truck equipped with flame pots, the failure of the 
defendant to use the flame pots to warn oncoming 
drivers, might properly be considered in determin-
ing if the defendant exercised ordinary care, al-
though defendant may not have violated any stat-
ute by failing to place flame pots or other warning 
signals on the highway. · 
Frame v. Arrow Towing Service, 64 P.2d 1312, 
Oregon, held that the failure of the operator of a tow 
car to place signs or signal on the roadway warning 
of the highway obstruction, would establish a prima 
facie case of negligence against the operator. See 
also Ashe v. Hughes, Mississippi, 69 So. 2d 210; Gonyo 
v. Hewson, New York, 162 N.Y.S. Supp. 2d 304; 
Gaber v. Wienberg, Penn., 188 A. 187; V andenack v. 
Crosby, Wisconsin, 82 N.E. 2d 307; Smith v. Litron, 
La., 47 So. 2d 411; Cooper v. Teter, 15 S.E. 2d 152, 
West Virginia; Robinson v. Briggs Transportation 
Co., Wisconsin, 76 N.W. 2d 294. 
Many cases held that where a man is working 
on the highway, on a stalled or disabled automobile, 
that the worker has the duty to pay attention to on-
coming traffic. Descombaz v. Klock, South Dakota, 
240 N. W. 495, involved a motorist stopped on the 
highway because of a flat tire. His car lights were 
on and another vehicle hit him from the rear. The 
plaintiff was found negligent as a matter of law in 
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failing to keep a proper lookout to avoid injury from 
moving traffic. The court said: 
"Had plaintiff given any lookout for de-
fendant's car approaching with headlights 
plainly visible, there we would have plenty 
of time for him to step out from in front of 
his car after it became apparent that a col-
lision from the rear would occur." 
The court in that decision set out that if plaintiff 
saw and failed to act prudently, he was negligent, 
and if he failed to look he was negligent for failure 
to keep any lookout. The following cases hold that 
one working on a disabled vehicle on the highway 
at night, has the duty to keep a proper lookout for 
oncoming vehicles. Binette, Admd. v. LePage, 
Maine, 123 A. 2nd 711; Underwriters v. E·mployers 
Liability Ins. Co., 28 So. 2d 118; Fortman v. McBride, 
263 N.W. 345; Dragotis v. Kennedy, Minnesota, 250 
N.W. ~04. 
There was a factual question presented for the 
jury as to whether or not the decedent James Warner 
Taylor left his wrecker unnecessarily long on the 
highway blocking a portion of the east lane and ob-
structing the vision of oncoming traffic. After Tay-
lor had hooked onto the Milner vehicle, he had suffi-
cient time to move the wrecker off the highway, place 
out flares to warn oncoming traffic, and put his 
wrecker in such a position that the headlights did 
not blind oncoming traffic. In the case of Harry 
Holder Motor Co. v. Davidson, Kenutcky, 243 S.W. 
49 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2d 926, it has held that the driver of a wrecker 
should not stop upon the traveled portion of the 
highway longer than a reasonable length of time, or 
occupy more of the highway than is reasonably 
necessary. He should reasonably warn approach-
ing traffic of the obstruction by lights, flares, or 
other practical means available under the circum-
stances. 
Appellant complains of the court's instruction 
to the jury No. 22 concerning the emergency rule. 
Instruction No. 23 given by the court, is a further 
instruction on the emergency rule doctrine, and this 
is a requested instruction by plaintiff. Plaintiff 
cannot request the court to instruct on a theory of 
law, and then complain that such theory was pre-
sented to the jury. This court has many times held 
that a party cannot complain of error, invited by 
him. Mann v. Fairbourn, 12 Utah 2d 342, 366 
P.2d 603; Alvarez v. Paulus, 333 P.2d 633, 8 Utah 2d 
283; Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2nd 266, 272 P.2d 
185. 
In Point III, appellant complains of the number 
of instructions given by the court. Of the 46 in-
structions given, 12 are form instructions concern-
ing the duty of the jury, basic definitions, etc. Elev 
en of the instructions are instructions on damages 
plaintiff was seeking. Any overweight of number 
of instructions was on the side of damage instruc-
tions. Instruction were numerous, but rather than 
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long complicated instruction, the court gave short, 
concise instructions. The fact that the total number 
was 4 7 is no indication of the length of instructions. 
Appellant complains of Instruction No. 33. The 
theories in that instruction were in part in Instruc-
tion No. 26 given by the court, and which was plain-
tiff's request. 
Instruction No. 26, being plaintiff's request, re-
fers to the display of flares, lights, or other practical 
means, if a vehicle is not equipped with lights de-
signated by the Utah State Road Commission. The 
record fails to reveal any evidence or fact that the 
wrecker operated by James Warner Taylor was 
equipped, in any manner, by lights designated by the 
Utah State Road Commission. There is no evidence 
that the Utah State Road Co1nmission designated 
any lights for wreckers or any other vehicles. No 
evidence being before the court or jury as to what 
lights designated by the Utah State Road Commis-
sion were required, plaintiff then requested the 
court to instruct the jury that Mr. Taylor had the 
duty to reasonably warn approaching traffic, etc., 
by displaying lights, flares or other practical means. 
Plaintiff cannot now complain that the jury was 
instructed as to the duty to put out lights and flares, 
etc., when that was the request of plaintiff to 
instruct the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in refusing to direct 
a verdict for the plaintiff. The court correctly 
submitted to the jury the questions of negligence 
of plaintiff's decedent and of defendant, and the 
court did not commit prejudicial error in the instruc-
tions to the jury. 
The Judgment on the Verdict should be sus-
tained and plaintiff's appeal denied. 
HANSON AND BALDWIN 
Ford R. Paulson 
Attorneys for Respondent 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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